China already operates air deployable armoured vehicles from its Y-20 transport aircraft, and as of 2025 has fielded a range of new airborne equipment that is comparable to the Russian equipment. Given that an air manoeuvre operation for a battalion of the Russian supplied equipment would require around 35 Il-76s, while the PLAAF operates a fleet of 26 Il-76s, including 10 Il-76s sold to the PRC by the Russians in 2013, it may be asked why the PLA purchased a battalion set of Russian equipment. The fact that the contracts include a battalion’s worth of landing and parachute equipment suggests that the PLA expects to obtain the necessary aircraft, or to insert in multiple phases.
The greatest value of the deal to the PLA, however, is most likely in the training and the procedures for command and control of airborne forces, as Russia’s airborne forces have combat experience, while the PLA does not. The requirement for a battalion’s worth of equipment – with an expanded number of C2 platforms – likely speaks to the desire to conduct battalion scale collective training, and since the Russians are to deliver it, this must be conducted on Russian vehicles.
The deal also reflects the growing military-industrial co-operation between Russia and the PRC over the course of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On the Chinese side, the project is being handled by the Main Directorate for the Development of Armaments and Military Equipment of the Central Military Council with the involvement of representatives of the PLAAF and Airborne Forces Command. The Russian side of the deal is covered by Rosoboronexport, the sole state intermediary authorized to export military and dual-purpose goods, services, and technologies. But the deal involves participation from a range of Russian defence companies including PJSC Il (manufacturer of the Il-76/78), KBP Instrument Design Bureau (weapon systems), Sozvezdiye, United Instrument Corporation OPK and NIISSU (automatic control and communication systems), Kurganmashzavod and SKBM (armoured vehicles), NPP Rubin (command and surveillance vehicles), MKPK Universal, Technodynamika, and Polyot (parachute and landing systems), as well as 27 Central Research Institutes of the Russian Ministry of Défense. On the Chinese side, the implementation is being handled by state-owned companies AVIC (aviation), CETC (communications and control systems), and NORINCO (armoured vehicles, weapons, and ammunition).
Historically, Russia has been wary of exporting its areas of military-technical advantage to China out of fears of intellectual property theft. However, Moscow increasingly sees the invasion of Taiwan – and subsequent division of the global economic order into opposing spheres – as a means of building leverage over Beijing by making Russia a supplier of critical raw materials and military industrial capacity. For China, funding to Russian military industrial enterprises contributes to the continuation of fighting in Ukraine, which the PRC supports to fix NATO capacity in the European theatre. Nevertheless, China has hitherto sought to reduce the signature of its overt defence cooperation with Moscow. The question is whether these contracts represent a shift in Beijing’s willingness to deepen direct defence collaboration.